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JON STEPHENSON has reported 
on the Afghanistan conflict since the 
US-led war began in 2001. 
Shades of gray:  
The Taliban 
phenomenon
Taliban: The True Story of the 
World’s Most Feared Guer-
rilla Fighters ,  by James Fergus-
son. London: Bantam. 2010, 310 pp.  
ISBN 978-0-593066-34-8 (hardback)
I JUST CAN’T understand the Americans,’ an Afghan mullah 
tells British writer James Fergus-
son. ‘What they are doing makes no 
sense—and if they go on as they are, 
the whole country will rise against 
them.’
The mullah—an educated, apolit-
ical man, fluent in five languages—is 
hauled from his bed one night by US 
commandos. Beaten and dragged off 
to the notorious Bagram detention 
centre, he is later released, but is so 
outraged he joins the Taliban.
Fergusson’s story of the mistreat-
ed mullah is one of many amassed in 
his 14 years of reporting on Afghani-
stan. With crystal-clear writing and 
first-rate analysis, he deploys such 
anecdotes to devastating effect in 
Taliban, subtitled The True Story of 
the World’s Most Feared Guerrilla 
Fighters. 
The topic is complex, but the 
book’s structure is straightforward: 
the author first tells us who the Tali-
ban are, how their movement arose, 
and what they want. He then asks if 
a deal with them is possible—one 
that would see Western troops leave 
Afghanistan in exchange for a guar-
antee the country would not revert to 
a terrorist safe-haven. 
It is not only possible, he sug-
gests, but desirable. The insurgency 
is growing; the US military strategy 
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and Karzai administration are failing. 
We need a new plan, says Fergusson, 
and ‘a negotiated settlement with the 
Taliban looks increasingly like the 
West’s only way out of the mess’.
If the first principle of war is 
‘know your enemy’ then, in Fergus-
son’s eyes, the Americans have a lot 
to learn. The insurgents do not reject 
the West so much as the presence 
of infidel troops imposing Western 
political and social mores. 
As a movement the Taliban have 
been ‘relentlessly demonised’. They 
shared the same ideology as al Qaida, 
right? Wrong, says Fergusson. The 
relationship between Taliban leader 
Mullah Omar and Osama bin Laden 
was 90 percent about money. 
They banned all education for 
women, right? Wrong again, says the 
author, whose nuanced explanation 
of the mullahs’ mindset is fascinat-
ing. While their attitudes were not 
enlightened by Western standards, 
‘the Taliban were never quite the 
bearded bigots of popular Western 
imagination’.
They emerged as a force in the 
wake of the Soviet withdrawal from 
Afghanistan. But the Taliban—Pash-
tuns with a fierce tribal code who ad-
here to an austere form of Islam—ex-
isted long before the Bear got its paws 
burnt in the graveyard of empires. 
When the Russians left Afghani-
stan in 1989, the mujahideen and 
warlords who had ousted them started 
battling each other. Butchers and 
bandits ruled the land. By 1994 the 
Taliban had had enough. They left 
their madrasahs and fought their 
way to power with two key goals: to 
impose security and Sharia. 
‘Many worse things have hap-
pened to Afghanistan than the Tali-
ban government of 1996-2001,’ 
says Fergusson. He does not brush 
the Taliban’s dirt under the Afghan 
carpet—their treatment of the Hazara 
people was especially egregious—but 
argues they were for the most part 
misguided, not evil. 
‘It is not as if the West’s track 
record in Afghanistan over the past 
nine years is anything to boast about,’ 
he says. ‘Lawlessness, corruption, 
poppies: the Taliban arguably dealt 
with all those better than we have 
since 2001.’ 
Today US-led forces are support-
ing a corrupt and ineffective regime 
that includes warlords and criminals 
the Taliban ousted—one in particular 
whose human rights record is far 
from distinguished. The idea that this 
regime’s drug-addled and illiterate 
soldiers might ‘stand up’ to enable 
Western troops to ‘draw down’ some-
time soon is rightly dismissed by the 
author as fanciful.
As the tale of the mistreated mul-
lah reminds us, the way the US has 
prosecuted its counter-insurgency 
 PACIFIC JOURNALISM REVIEW 17 (1) 2011  237 
INVESTIGATIVE JOURNALISM
has only made things worse. Invading 
homes, detaining the wrong people, 
treating them with contempt—these 
are seen not only as an attack by in-
fidels on Muslims but as a violation 
of the Pashtun code that cannot go 
unanswered. 
This goes to the heart of the 
West’s failure in Afghanistan. In-
troducing Western-style institutions, 
backing leaders who have lined their 
own pockets while ignoring their 
people, and the wayward air strikes 
that have killed and injured innocent 
Afghans have all generated anger and 
resentment.
But in a place where respect 
and religion are paramount it is the 
offences against honour and Islam—
both real and perceived—that have 
arguably done the most damage, fan-
ning the flames of an insurgency that 
refuses to be extinguished. 
The bottom line? It’s time to talk. 
As Fergusson says, all insurgencies 
end in negotiations. How can we 
know if the Taliban will moderate 
their ways and share power respon-
sibly if we have not spoken to them? 
Critics will argue that they have 
not learnt from their mistakes and 
cannot be trusted—that the Taliban 
will open the back door to Al Qaida 
as the West shuts the front door on its 
way out of Afghanistan. Others will 
oppose giving ground on the insur-
gents’ desire to reintroduce Sharia. 
The issues are complex, but it 
is worth remembering that the 2001 
US-led invasion was justified as a 
response to terrorism, not the woeful 
predicament of Afghan women. If 
Western leaders want their troops to 
stay to curb Sharia they should say 
so, and be prepared to pay the price 
in blood and treasure.
As for Al Qaida, most as-
sessments suggest its presence in 
Afghanistan is essentially at an end, 
and that the Taliban’s goal is to end 
the occupation rather than advance 
bin Laden’s goals or ideology. If 
an agreement to deny the terrorists 
sanctuary was broken, they could be 
countered more effectively by drones 
and special forces than by an army of 
occupation. 
In any case, it seems increasingly 
clear that the occupiers have lost the 
battle for Pashtun hearts and minds, 
and as America’s former Afghanistan 
commander General Stanley Mc-
Chrystal once noted, ‘If the people are 
against us we cannot be successful.’ 
Debates aside, this is a stunning 
book. Avoiding cliché or the black 
and white analysis all-too-common 
among Afghanistan observers, Fer-
gusson illuminates many of the 
benighted nation’s shades of grey. 
Meticulously researched and deeply 
thoughtful, it is explanatory journal-
ism at its best. 
Copyright of Pacific Journalism Review is the property of Auckland University of Technology and its content
may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express
written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use.
http://www.aut.ac.nz/depts/commstud/journ/pjrsubs.shtml
